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11/14/2015 0 Comments Federalist 51Here, we'll look at Federalist 51 to find the underlying political theory of human nature and government. Without that base, it is impossible to understand the complicated structure for government that Madison painstakingly describes.Q: Why distinguish between the theoretical base and the practical design features? Is it not in fact your argument that they are inseparable? A: They are, but not every sentence does both. Seeing how they are woven together is useful. Take for example Madison's statement below that:
Here, he does not stick to the theory, but rather to the practicality of practice. Q: So why do we care about theory if it's trumped by practice? A: Political theory--or in this case, constitutional theory--needs both to function. By seeing how they weave together, we can note how they inform each other. Below is the full text of Federalist 51. The blue is the default main text color, and the political theory is in red. Obviously much deeper work is required, but consider this an introductory glance, but on the right, you can find brief explanatory notes by yours truly. |
| To the People of the State of New York: TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention. In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them. It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test. There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE. PUBLIUS. | Explanation of theory, and a few notes on practice: We can't rely on individuals to separate power themselves, so we need an interior structure to keep the government in line. The structure then rules over the "rulers"--or, the Constitution governs lawmakers, executives, judges at the national and state level. Separation of powers preserves liberty, so we must have a strong theory and practice of departmentalism. See my note above about how there is theory here, but Madison says that it won't quite work--can't completely separate the branches in practice. The judiciary, in particular, won't work under a principle of popular authority. They must have the proper qualifications for life tenure, not just popular support. Departments need to jealously guard their turf using constitutional means. Less powerful branches need to be able to resist more strongly. We're all ambitious--so let's use it! If office-holders see their interest as the same of their branches interest, the Constitution is stronger. You might bemoan this idea of human nature as ambitious, but we'd do better to not ignore that to make ourselves feel good. Our government needs to confront fundamental truths about human nature--we're not angels. Making government both stable and good means that it has to be able to govern, and it has to not step out of bounds. The people can keep it in bounds somewhat, but it's better to add to that precaution by using what some would call the flaws in human nature to make people in power keep power where it belongs constitutionally. This balancing of power is best achieved with checks and balances. It is in the private interest of the public officials in each branch to keep the power allocated to their branch where it belongs constitutionally. In republics, the legislature is the most dangerous, so split it up into pieces (similar to the theory of breaking faction in the extended republic in Federalist 10). Fortify the executive for further safety (and remember that the judiciary also needs special rules). The compound, or extended, republic divides the whole government into pieces at the national and state levels. This protects individual rights, as the governments must fight each other to take away those rights. Remember, we still need to protect society from factions, as they will always exist (see Federalist 10). The federal republic breaks down the ability of factions to take over. This rights discourse appears throughout the Federalist Papers, and it should be noted that James Madison wished to put similar statements in the excised first paragraph of the Preamble in 1789. Justice as the end, or purpose, of government. See here the connection between government and civil society: they cannot be separated without ill effects. Justice preserves liberty, and without it, the evils of tyranny and/or anarchy are likely. The state of nature here sounds Hobbesian, given the violent aspects of it. When the strong submit to government, they want to make it work for them as well. This is good for the strong and the weak if it protects the interests of both, as the government will not be quickly abandoned. |
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In reading Alfarabi carefully, all of us are going outside of our comfort zones. But we're finding a lot of Aristotle, and we're probably thinking ahead to Aquinas.
Below, I have created a presentation slide and included a page of notes and questions. When you present to others, it is best not to jam everything in, and ordinarily I wouldn't do so. But I wanted to show that Alfarabi can be made simpler and graphically understandable--albeit cluttered--in one page.
So now, without further ado, onto the most cramped graphical representation of Alfarabi yet...
Below, I have created a presentation slide and included a page of notes and questions. When you present to others, it is best not to jam everything in, and ordinarily I wouldn't do so. But I wanted to show that Alfarabi can be made simpler and graphically understandable--albeit cluttered--in one page.
So now, without further ado, onto the most cramped graphical representation of Alfarabi yet...
Now, what if I told you that the diagram above came from these notes?
And led to these questions?
Today we're splitting into groups again in order to answer these questions for each section of the first half of Alfarabi's Book of Religion. If we are successful, we will be able to create a graphical representation like Wednesday's, and understand the main debates Alfarabi intends to start about the primacy of political science over religion, and knowledge over opinion.
9/14/2015 0 Comments
Menexenus
Ah, the Menexenus. Honestly, I'm not a Plato scholar so I didn't know about it at all before this class. But, if you get the Thucydides-Plato combo I pushed last post, you get to do a cool comparison between funeral orations. Good stuff.
Below are two versions of paragraph summaries we did for last Friday's class. The first summary was done by two (unnamed) lovely ladies from my class, and the second is mine. Check out the differences--mine is more historical, theirs is more conceptual. Proves there's more than one way to analyze a text, and that you don't need a PhD to do it.
The assignment:
You may work in groups of 1-3, but all students should have notes in class Friday.
Read 236.d-246a (p.37-50)
Write one sentence/phrase per paragraph that finds the point while summarizing
Decide if you would group these paragraphs into larger sections
Student version:
This is transcribed exactly from student notes with the students’ permissions.
Socrates recalling what Aspasia has told him
236a (Honor) The men who have fallen deserve tribute.
237b The current generation is the most superior in Athens (implies born in Athens).
237c It is an honor for Athens to be respected by the gods.
237d (Superior) Athens is worthy of praise.
The gods praise us, so we are praiseworthy.
238b Gods have provided for Athens, so Athenians should be grateful (military, natural resources).
Athens needs/received help in order to achieve greatness.
Gods deemed them great, so they are great.
239a (Superior) Athens’ democracy is unique and praiseworthy.
239d Ironic
Is it referring to transition: slavery -> democracy?
241c Greeks are courageous by nature (ancestors were courageous).
241d Civil war of Greece?
242a Athens not responsible for war.
242c Athens only takes credit when credit is earned. Is credit actually due?
242c (Honor) Athens will help those in need.
243c Preparation always occurring? Athens believes they are prepared in nature.
244c Athenians are self-reliant/don’t rely on allies.
249b (Courage) They are willing to help others, but are not willing to accept help.
246a Fallen are praiseworthy.
Themes
239a&d/241c Fallen deserve tribute.
239a&d/241c Democracy
237b&d Superiority
243a/243e/244c/249b Allies
My version:
*The first numbers refer to paragraphs, with Stephanus numbers after the comma.*
1—37, 236d-237b
Good speeches can bring more honor than good deeds.
2—37, 237b-c
These men honored their mother country and we should all praise her, the source of our greatness.
3—37-38, 237c-d
Our country is most praised by gods and men.
4—38, 237d-238a
Our country is praised for creating and sustaining intelligent life (human beings).
5—38-39, 238b-239a
Our ancestors created our noble and praiseworthy aristocracy with its virtue of equality and blessing of the multitude.
6—39-40, 239a-c
Our good heritage and birth led to our nobility, which has been documented by poets in part but we must expand on it here so that no one forgets and future poets can write about us.
7—40, 239d-240a
The Persians once enslaved all men, including us—despite our greatness—they enslaved us and our minds.
8—41, 240a-e
The Athenians and Spartans rose up against barbarians at Marathon and gave birth to our freedom.
9—42, 240e-241c
Those at sea battles (Salamis) enhanced our reputation for freedom among all Greeks.
10—42-43, 241c
Platea was “greatest and most difficult” but successful due to the joint work of Athens and Sparta.
11—43, 241d-e
The reports of the King of Barbarians destroying Greece led to a battle that gave “full safety.”
12—44, 241e-242a
All Greeks loved Athens until their desire to emulate turned to envy.
13—44 242a-c
Athens won over Sparta not necessarily in battle, but definitely in helping Greeks be free.
14—44-45, 242c-e
Athens vanquished them but made peace and did not destroy them.
15—45-47, 242e-d
In the third war, the Greeks hated Athens so much that they asked the King to help. Thus Athens “took them down” all together.
16—47-48, 242d-244b
Athens wasn’t overcome in any war but the inner discord brought on by the tyrants hurt them; fortunately, the exiles deposed them. (See footnote 28!)
17—48-49, 242b-245a
Athens wanted peace but eventually Sparta’s aggression led Athens to intervene for the sake of freedom of other Greeks and even the King. But then the Greeks re-enslaved themselves.
18—49-50, 245b-246a
Athens was winning against Sparta, so the King got scared, which led the other Greek allies to desert Athens, and Athens was left alone in its pure Greek virtue.
19—50-51, 246a-c
The nobility of Athens’ dead ancestors means Athenians today must strive to be good and noble.
Note: As far as I can tell, the King always refers to the king of Persia.
Below are two versions of paragraph summaries we did for last Friday's class. The first summary was done by two (unnamed) lovely ladies from my class, and the second is mine. Check out the differences--mine is more historical, theirs is more conceptual. Proves there's more than one way to analyze a text, and that you don't need a PhD to do it.
The assignment:
You may work in groups of 1-3, but all students should have notes in class Friday.
Read 236.d-246a (p.37-50)
Write one sentence/phrase per paragraph that finds the point while summarizing
Decide if you would group these paragraphs into larger sections
Student version:
This is transcribed exactly from student notes with the students’ permissions.
Socrates recalling what Aspasia has told him
236a (Honor) The men who have fallen deserve tribute.
237b The current generation is the most superior in Athens (implies born in Athens).
237c It is an honor for Athens to be respected by the gods.
237d (Superior) Athens is worthy of praise.
The gods praise us, so we are praiseworthy.
238b Gods have provided for Athens, so Athenians should be grateful (military, natural resources).
Athens needs/received help in order to achieve greatness.
Gods deemed them great, so they are great.
239a (Superior) Athens’ democracy is unique and praiseworthy.
239d Ironic
Is it referring to transition: slavery -> democracy?
241c Greeks are courageous by nature (ancestors were courageous).
241d Civil war of Greece?
242a Athens not responsible for war.
242c Athens only takes credit when credit is earned. Is credit actually due?
242c (Honor) Athens will help those in need.
243c Preparation always occurring? Athens believes they are prepared in nature.
244c Athenians are self-reliant/don’t rely on allies.
249b (Courage) They are willing to help others, but are not willing to accept help.
246a Fallen are praiseworthy.
Themes
239a&d/241c Fallen deserve tribute.
239a&d/241c Democracy
237b&d Superiority
243a/243e/244c/249b Allies
My version:
*The first numbers refer to paragraphs, with Stephanus numbers after the comma.*
1—37, 236d-237b
Good speeches can bring more honor than good deeds.
2—37, 237b-c
These men honored their mother country and we should all praise her, the source of our greatness.
3—37-38, 237c-d
Our country is most praised by gods and men.
4—38, 237d-238a
Our country is praised for creating and sustaining intelligent life (human beings).
5—38-39, 238b-239a
Our ancestors created our noble and praiseworthy aristocracy with its virtue of equality and blessing of the multitude.
6—39-40, 239a-c
Our good heritage and birth led to our nobility, which has been documented by poets in part but we must expand on it here so that no one forgets and future poets can write about us.
7—40, 239d-240a
The Persians once enslaved all men, including us—despite our greatness—they enslaved us and our minds.
8—41, 240a-e
The Athenians and Spartans rose up against barbarians at Marathon and gave birth to our freedom.
9—42, 240e-241c
Those at sea battles (Salamis) enhanced our reputation for freedom among all Greeks.
10—42-43, 241c
Platea was “greatest and most difficult” but successful due to the joint work of Athens and Sparta.
11—43, 241d-e
The reports of the King of Barbarians destroying Greece led to a battle that gave “full safety.”
12—44, 241e-242a
All Greeks loved Athens until their desire to emulate turned to envy.
13—44 242a-c
Athens won over Sparta not necessarily in battle, but definitely in helping Greeks be free.
14—44-45, 242c-e
Athens vanquished them but made peace and did not destroy them.
15—45-47, 242e-d
In the third war, the Greeks hated Athens so much that they asked the King to help. Thus Athens “took them down” all together.
16—47-48, 242d-244b
Athens wasn’t overcome in any war but the inner discord brought on by the tyrants hurt them; fortunately, the exiles deposed them. (See footnote 28!)
17—48-49, 242b-245a
Athens wanted peace but eventually Sparta’s aggression led Athens to intervene for the sake of freedom of other Greeks and even the King. But then the Greeks re-enslaved themselves.
18—49-50, 245b-246a
Athens was winning against Sparta, so the King got scared, which led the other Greek allies to desert Athens, and Athens was left alone in its pure Greek virtue.
19—50-51, 246a-c
The nobility of Athens’ dead ancestors means Athenians today must strive to be good and noble.
Note: As far as I can tell, the King always refers to the king of Persia.
For those of you who have never read this or for those who haven't in a while, go to amazon right now and buy this edition/translation! I can vouch for Collins and Stauffer being good people and good scholars--an unusual mix!
Plato’s Menexenus and Pericles’ Funeral Oration, Empire and the Ends of Politics
trans., intro., and notes Susan Collins and Devin Stauffer
(Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 1999)
ISBN: 0-941051-70-6
Plato’s Menexenus and Pericles’ Funeral Oration, Empire and the Ends of Politics
trans., intro., and notes Susan Collins and Devin Stauffer
(Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 1999)
ISBN: 0-941051-70-6
9/14/2015 0 Comments
Welcome to POL211!
Yep, we're two weeks into the semester now. However, if you're just joining us, please go to my syllabi page and download the syllabus (updated on the website when things change), the notes on assignments, and eventually, the portfolio how-to guide.
If you missed my introductory lecture, here are my notes, slightly edited. This gives you an idea of why we're here and what I hope to accomplish:
Things to discuss:
Who am I?
--native MD, TX transplant, back home
--philosophy/constitutional law
--love to teach!
--Machiavelli and Madison scholar
--public school kid, excited to see how this is different
Questions? (Reasonable ones J)
Why this class/why is it this way?
I’m a blend of approaches—some of my teachers only wanted to read text, some were obsessed with context over text. Philosophy of politics—and I will use theory and philosophy interchangeably—are heavy on persuasion, rhetoric, and argument. In short, studying political philosophy requires heavy attention to details of argument and persuasive powers.
BUT it’s really hard to combine the two? Can anyone think of any career politician alive who does both? Charisma and wonkishness are difficult to combine.
That’s not to say it doesn’t happen—Lincoln, Churchill—Pericles, who we’ll meet this week—but it is also important to notice that we appreciate these men (and women—though even for me it’s hard to think of someone we’d put in this league in politics…) more when they’re dead…probably because they convinced us and became heroes.
So, because good politicians are hard to find and good governments hard to keep, political philosophy started up. We’re doing a “Plato to NATO” course here, but I think that’s good. Even if you’re not interested in theory ultimately, this gives you a great background.
This course is divided into four sections—ancient, medieval, modern, contemporary. Some of this is arbitrary, but the way it goes in this course is this: ancient is Greeks, medieval starts with monotheism, Machiavelli kicks off modernity, somewhere around Nietzsche and the 20th century contemporary starts.
I won’t do much contemporary here. Why? I really don’t think you can understand a contemporary rejection of Plato without reading Plato first. It’s hard to read Plato alone. Really, it’s hard to read any of this alone. So your contemporary will mostly consist of variations on themes that we’ve already covered.
Why no women?? I know. I really know. Unfortunately, there’s not much until recently. Fortunately, that will change. The same is true (in Western thought) for non-white men. Makes me nutsy, but I don’t know a way around it.
This course aims to cover a variety of themes, and we will focus on themes every day.
Constitutionalism gets more airtime because that’s what I do (take out pocket Constitution) and because without a good political order philosophy can’t have much of an effect. I think we’d all rather discuss American constitutionalism rather than Spartan constitutionalism in ancient Greece, given that none of us in the room (I’m guessing) read Ancient Greek (if there are, I’m in awe) and we don’t have access to much there.
My goals for this course:
--Give you a basic understanding of history of Western political philosophy
--Give you tools to dissect arguments (see portfolio work) so that we’re not at sea here and for your future academic success
--Have good discussions about this and learn things myself
I hope to convince you as your teacher that…
…philosophy and politics need each other to function.
…precise argumentation and rhetoric should be friends.
…there is a serious difference between mere and substantiated opinion, and that you should only use the latter.
…reading “the classics” with the right tools is satisfying.
If you missed my introductory lecture, here are my notes, slightly edited. This gives you an idea of why we're here and what I hope to accomplish:
Things to discuss:
Who am I?
--native MD, TX transplant, back home
--philosophy/constitutional law
--love to teach!
--Machiavelli and Madison scholar
--public school kid, excited to see how this is different
Questions? (Reasonable ones J)
Why this class/why is it this way?
I’m a blend of approaches—some of my teachers only wanted to read text, some were obsessed with context over text. Philosophy of politics—and I will use theory and philosophy interchangeably—are heavy on persuasion, rhetoric, and argument. In short, studying political philosophy requires heavy attention to details of argument and persuasive powers.
BUT it’s really hard to combine the two? Can anyone think of any career politician alive who does both? Charisma and wonkishness are difficult to combine.
That’s not to say it doesn’t happen—Lincoln, Churchill—Pericles, who we’ll meet this week—but it is also important to notice that we appreciate these men (and women—though even for me it’s hard to think of someone we’d put in this league in politics…) more when they’re dead…probably because they convinced us and became heroes.
So, because good politicians are hard to find and good governments hard to keep, political philosophy started up. We’re doing a “Plato to NATO” course here, but I think that’s good. Even if you’re not interested in theory ultimately, this gives you a great background.
This course is divided into four sections—ancient, medieval, modern, contemporary. Some of this is arbitrary, but the way it goes in this course is this: ancient is Greeks, medieval starts with monotheism, Machiavelli kicks off modernity, somewhere around Nietzsche and the 20th century contemporary starts.
I won’t do much contemporary here. Why? I really don’t think you can understand a contemporary rejection of Plato without reading Plato first. It’s hard to read Plato alone. Really, it’s hard to read any of this alone. So your contemporary will mostly consist of variations on themes that we’ve already covered.
Why no women?? I know. I really know. Unfortunately, there’s not much until recently. Fortunately, that will change. The same is true (in Western thought) for non-white men. Makes me nutsy, but I don’t know a way around it.
This course aims to cover a variety of themes, and we will focus on themes every day.
Constitutionalism gets more airtime because that’s what I do (take out pocket Constitution) and because without a good political order philosophy can’t have much of an effect. I think we’d all rather discuss American constitutionalism rather than Spartan constitutionalism in ancient Greece, given that none of us in the room (I’m guessing) read Ancient Greek (if there are, I’m in awe) and we don’t have access to much there.
My goals for this course:
--Give you a basic understanding of history of Western political philosophy
--Give you tools to dissect arguments (see portfolio work) so that we’re not at sea here and for your future academic success
--Have good discussions about this and learn things myself
I hope to convince you as your teacher that…
…philosophy and politics need each other to function.
…precise argumentation and rhetoric should be friends.
…there is a serious difference between mere and substantiated opinion, and that you should only use the latter.
…reading “the classics” with the right tools is satisfying.
Dr. Jacqueline Hunsicker's course blog
This page chronicles the travails of POL211 at CUA in Fall of 2005. Do let me know if you need additional materials posted!
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